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By Birth or Consent: Children, Law and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority.  
By Holly Brewer (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina P., 2005; pp. xvi + 390. £26.50).                 
In recent years, the cross-examination of the legal history of early modern Britain 
and its colonial possessions has generated an abundance of scholarship. Previous 
generations’ laments about the bifurcation of the study of legal systems and social practices, 
or concerns about the wearisome tasks involved in making sense of the legal records, have 
withered away. Indeed, the possibilities of locating legal theories and practices within 
cultural as well as institutional contexts, of isolating moments of intersection and points of 
diversion, have excited the interest of social historians outside the legal academy (on both 
sides of the Atlantic), and in so doing transformed one of the most stagnant fields of 
historical enquiry into one of the most conceptually adventurous.  
In this correspondingly bold and ambitious book, Holly Brewer describes a 
fundamental shift in Anglo-American assumptions about childhood, and about authority, 
between the mid-sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The wide range of public 
activities that children of all ages pursued legally in the earlier period was gradually and 
sporadically abrogated, in consequence of the consolidation of new religious and political 
ideologies. By the early nineteenth century, Brewer asserts, the reformulation of legal 
practices had deprived children of an agency they had once freely exercised: no more would 
youngsters beneath specified ages be allowed to vote, be elected to office, act as jurors, or 
be held accountable for capital crimes, for instance. Whereas  ‘ status [had once] trumped 
age ’ , Brewer discerns in the later era a  ‘ pattern of age trumping rank ’ . Once authority 
was contingent on the principle of reasoned consent, rather than the assumption of 
birthright, those deemed incapable of exercising reason on account of their age fell by the 
wayside.   
Brewer’s handling of a multifarious collection of challenging sources across a large 
span of time and space is an extremely impressive feat of juggling. Among its many other 
virtues, the book is an example of  ‘ Atlantic History ’  at its best — that is to say, a 
multifaceted and comparative exploration of the extent to which the two societies 
inﬂuenced one another’s development. Ideas and practices rippled both ways across the 
ocean, and Brewer carefully maps out the degree of synchronicity in Anglo-American legal 
developments. For instance, regulations setting a minimum age of twenty-one for election 
to serve in the lower house of a legislature were imposed by Puritans in Massachusetts Bay 
in 1641, adopted by Cromwell’s Barebones Parliament in England in 1653, and copied by the 
Virginia assembly in 1655 (though rescinded with the Restoration). Whether describing 
changes in suffrage requirements, criminal liability, evidence law, custody regulations, or 
inheritance patterns, Brewer elegantly explodes the comfortable myth that legal 
stipulations were laid down in custom immemorial, inﬂexible, and somehow shorn of 
human agency. Indeed, she demonstrates that the law was surprisingly responsive to both 
the machinations of individual jurists and the changing ideological climate in a given polity 
— be it Puritan Massachusetts, Stuart England, or the early national United States.   
The book is organised in two parts, with the ﬁrst three chapters sketching out the 
various ideological contexts that facilitated changes in perceptions of childhood, and the 
remainder explaining how, where, and when these changes were manifested in practice and 
at law. Brewer offers a stylish exposition of the writings of intellectual theorists and policy-
makers ranging across seventeenth-century religious dissenters, colonial apologists,  ‘ 
classical republican ’  and eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers, and 
Revolutionary ideologues. The argument here is powerful, engrossing, and pursued with the 
relentless tenacity that is surely a prerequisite of analysing early modern legal treatises — 
even if some readers may ﬁnd it occasionally repetitious, or even bullish. To adopt a crassly 
oversimpliﬁed analogy, Brewer describes how the landscape of ‘patriarchalism’  that 
characterised Tudor and early Stuart England — at both familial and state levels — was 
reshaped by a series of environmental shocks, including sixteenth-century Reformation 
theology, seventeenth-century disputes over liturgical practice, baptism, and casuistry, the 
political revolutions that did away with two Stuart monarchs, changes in patterns of land 
inheritance, and the onset of the American Revolution. These great agents of change 
reconﬁgured, albeit haphazardly and unevenly, how Anglo-Americans understood reason, 
authority, and capacity, culminating by the early nineteenth century in ‘a new deﬁnition of 
childhood’. 
This account has far-reaching implications, and is likely to raise impressed and 
inquisitive eyebrows among different readerships. As Brewer remarks throughout the book, 
and builds on in a suggestive (though too cursory) concluding chapter, historical 
assumptions about childhood and the meaning of consent inevitably spilled over into myriad 
other debates — over speciﬁc issues such as imperial governance, public education, and 
female suffrage, or more general discussions of slavery and class conﬂict. Perhaps a 
readership conversant in early modern British history is less liable to be shocked than an 
Americanist one at the prospect of child MPs or teenage jurymen, and some may be 
disappointed at the narrowly Anglocentric trajectory of Brewer’s ‘Age of Reason’ that 
touches only lightly on legal-intellectual developments in continental Europe or other parts 
of the British Isles (and more especially Scotland). Although she acknowledges a degree of 
artiﬁciality inherent in her categorisation, Brewer’s synthesis of an intellectual ‘common 
front against patriarchal and absolutist ideology’ remains open to contention. There are 
good grounds to question the alignment of Puritans with Quakers, John Locke with ‘classical 
republicans’, and John Adams with Thomas Jefferson, or for that matter a sometimes 
teleological methodology that asserts that  ‘ the Dissenters ’  consent-based arguments 
inspired democratic-republican political thought’ which transmuted into the  ‘ ideology of 
the American Revolution ’ . At times, for instance in the discussion of child punishments in 
Chapter Six or the dismissive sidestepping of demographic data in Chapter Eight, it seems 
that the author is trying too hard.   
There is no need: so much here is impressive and original, both in terms of breadth 
of argument and richness of detail, that these grumbles should best be viewed as the 
inevitable corollary of absorbing and provocative scholarship. In breaking open the  ‘ myth 
of the unchanging common law ’  and charting its subtle reconstruction by Edward Coke, 
Matthew Hale, and William Blackstone (among others), Brewer successfully intermixes 
social, intellectual, and legal history, and situates childhood at the heart of seminal debates 
about power and its application in Anglo-America. Legal practice was the conduit through 
which political and religious theory manifested itself in cultural change. This approach, as 
Brewer shows, provides fresh insight into plenty of familiar debates. Americanists will ﬁnd 
the New England Puritans recast as prescient reformers and legal Anglicisation in the 
colonies in the eighteenth century (and beyond), as well as Revolutionary radicalism 
reinterpreted. Historians of the mother country will ﬁnd John Locke subtly repositioned, the 
old transition from ‘status to contract’ reﬁned, and new insights into juvenile criminality, 
marriage contracts, and parental custody. Signiﬁcantly, both sets of scholars will be 
reminded of their subjects’ interdependence and reciprocity, as evidenced in the book’s 
appendix which lists English legal treatises used by Americans before the nineteenth 
century. Brewer demonstrates that both the law and the position of children in the early 
modern era were dynamically responsive to new ideas. Tied together increasingly by the 
dominant parameter of age, they outlined both the extent and the limitations of modern 
citizenship. This striking book deserves a wide readership, and advances a hypothesis that 
warrants further testing both within and beyond Anglo-America.      
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